Maneuvering in Poor Visibility : How Firms Play the Ecosystem Game when Uncertainty is High by Dattée, Brice et al.
HAL Id: hal-02276702
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02276702
Submitted on 3 Sep 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Maneuvering in Poor Visibility : How Firms Play the
Ecosystem Game when Uncertainty is High
Brice Dattée, Oliver Alexy, Erkko Autio
To cite this version:
Brice Dattée, Oliver Alexy, Erkko Autio. Maneuvering in Poor Visibility : How Firms Play the
Ecosystem Game when Uncertainty is High. Academy of Management Journal, 2018, 466-498 p.
￿hal-02276702￿
r Academy of Management Journal
2018, Vol. 61, No. 2, 466–498.
https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2015.0869
MANEUVERING IN POOR VISIBILITY: HOW FIRMS PLAY
THE ECOSYSTEM GAME WHEN UNCERTAINTY IS HIGH
BRICE DATTE´E
Emlyon Business School
OLIVER ALEXY
Technische Universita¨t Mu¨nchen
ERKKO AUTIO
Imperial College London
and
Tilburg University School of Economics and Management
Innovation ecosystems are increasingly regarded as important vehicles to create and
capture value from complex value propositions. While current literature assumes these
value propositions can be known ex ante and an appropriate ecosystem design derived
from them, we focus on generative technological innovations that enable an unbounded
range of potential value propositions, hence offering no clear guidance to firms. To
illustrate our arguments, we inductively study two organizations, each attempting to
create two novel ecosystems around new technological enablers deep in their industry
architecture. We highlight how ecosystem creation in such conditions is a systemic
process driven by coupled feedback loops, which organizations must try to control
dynamically: firms first make the switch to creating the ecosystem, following an external
pull to narrow down the range of potential applications; then need to learn to keep up
with ecosystem dynamics by roadmapping and preempting, while simultaneously
enacting resonance. Dynamic control further entails counteracting the drifting away of
the nascent ecosystem from the firm’s idea of future value creation and the sliding of
its intended control points for value capture. Our findings shed new light on strategy
and control in emerging ecosystems, and provide guidance to managers on playing
the ecosystem game.
Firms increasingly form “innovation ecosystems”
to implement complex value propositions (e.g.,
Adner, 2012; Kapoor & Lee, 2013; Nambisan &
Baron, 2013; van der Borgh, Cloodt, & Romme,
2012; Williamson & De Meyer, 2012). Defined as
“the collaborative arrangements through which
firms combine their individual offerings into a
coherent, customer-facing solution” (Adner, 2006:
98), at the core of an innovation ecosystem one often
finds a technology platform: a set of shared assets,
standards, and interfaces that underpins an activity
system surrounding it (Gawer, 2014; Thomas, Autio,
& Gann, 2014). Such platforms typically reside upon
a layered digital infrastructure, where lower-level
layers (e.g., physical components, transmission
layer) enable and support functionalities at higher,
user-facing layers (e.g., operating systems layer, ap-
plication layer) (Tilson, Lyytinen, & Sørensen, 2010;
Yoo, Henfridsson, & Lyytinen, 2010). To create
value, ecosystems hence depend on complemen-
tary inputs made by loosely interconnected, yet
independent stakeholders from varying levels of
(technological) distance from the end consumer
(Adner, 2006; Pagani, 2013).
How do such ecosystems come into being? While
there has been increasing research on the distinct
governance and orchestration challenges presented
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by established innovation ecosystems (e.g., Dhanaraj
& Parkhe, 2006; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011;
Wareham, Fox, & Cano Giner, 2014), much less work
has addressed how prospective ecosystem stake-
holders commit resources toward a de novo ecosys-
tem creation effort and how they evolve a shared
structure of interactions (Autio & Thomas, 2013;
Hannah & Eisenhardt, 2015). Yet, committing to a de
novo ecosystem creation effort is not a simple en-
deavor, as ecosystem value propositions typically
depend on the concurrent availability of comple-
mentary inputs from varied, independent stake-
holders (Ceccagnoli, Forman, Huang, & Wu, 2012;
Davis, 2013). This mutual dependency in value crea-
tion creates a “chicken and egg” problem: if the plat-
formor its complements are of little value in isolation,
how does one persuade someone to commit first, and
evolve a collective framework of participation?
The standard response to this dilemma is that the
ecosystem champion, or “keystone” (Iansiti & Levien,
2004), should come upwith a compelling “blueprint”
for the future ecosystem; one vision that clearly
defines the ecosystem value proposition (i.e., what
value is created, how, and for whom) and associ-
ated structures of governance and interaction (i.e.,
who does what, who controls what, and how every-
one will benefit) (Adner, 2006, 2012; Edelman, 2015;
Eisenmann, 2008; Iansiti & Levien, 2004; Williamson
& De Meyer, 2012). A compelling vision, hence, re-
duces uncertainty, facilitates coordination, and en-
ables the focal firm to paint the future ecosystemas an
impending reality, prompting potential stakeholders
to join early for fear of “missing the train” (Ozcan &
Eisenhardt, 2009; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009).
However, such tactics rely on the common and
fundamental assumption that it is possible to envi-
sion, ex ante, one compelling ecosystem blueprint
that is tangible enough to reduce uncertainty, so that
appropriate action for the present can be inferred
(almost) by logic alone. Such envisioning is easier
in situations where user needs are relatively well
known and the customer-facing value proposition
can be tangibly imagined. For example, Apple was
able to tangibly describe its vision for the future
iTunes-, iPod-, and iPhone-centricmusic ecosystem,
allowing record labels to comprehend how the eco-
system would work and anticipate their role in it—
including how they would make money from it
(Eaton, Elaluf-Calderwood, Sørensen, & Yoo, 2011;
Ingraham, 2013).
Such envisioning, however, is not always possible
(Anderson, 1999; Dougherty & Dunne, 2011; Dunne
& Dougherty, 2016), particularly not when it is built
on generative technologies—technologies that have
the potential to produce unprompted change and to
create a breathtaking variety of potential future ap-
plications (Gruber, MacMillan, & Thompson, 2008;
Zittrain, 2006). For example, attempts to introduce
new technologies at lower layers of the digital in-
frastructure (say, new chip standards to enable
near–field communications for “Internet of Things”
applications) typically tend to enable such a large
number of potential user-facing applications at up-
per layers that this caneasily overwhelmprospective
stakeholders. In turn, this may undermine the eco-
system champion’s efforts to come up with a single
vision that is compelling enough to crowd out alter-
native visions so as to align required stakeholders
around it, while positioning itself to occupy the
“bottleneck” positions within the ecosystem to ap-
propriate a disproportionate share of the collectively
created value (Baldwin, 2015; Hannah & Eisenhardt,
2015; Jacobides & Tae, 2015).
These considerations highlight the question we
address in this paper: how does an ecosystem
champion compel others to commit to a de novo
ecosystem creation effort in a situation where un-
certainty is so high that: (1) it is not possible to create
a meaningful vision to simply enlist prospective
stakeholders, and (2) ecosystem champions them-
selves do not have good enough visibility to inform
them on how to position themselves adequately for
eventual value appropriation once an ecosystem,
whatever it may look like, is in place?
We chose an embedded multiple-case design based
on literal replication (Yin, 2014) to tackle this question.
We conducted in-depth qualitative process research
(Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013) with two multina-
tional technology firms, for each of which we studied
two attempts to imagine novel and complex value
propositions and create the innovation ecosystems
required to deliver and exploit them. We draw on
a series of primary interviews and extensive secondary
data as a baseline for these four case studies and take
several measures to corroborate our theorizing.
Our findings support three notable contributions
to the literature on innovation strategy and strategic
entrepreneurship. First, we extend received wisdom
on the effective design of innovation ecosystems
(e.g., Adner, 2012;Gawer&Cusumano, 2002; Iansiti &
Levien, 2004) to contexts in which these cannot be
reliably planned, as no clear value proposition to or-
chestrate the ecosystem exists ex ante. We show how,
in such cases, ecosystem creation becomes a process
of collective discovery orchestrated by the focal firm,
which tries to delay its resource commitments for as
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long as possible to prevent betting on the wrong
horse. Second, in order to understand how firms can
successfully navigate this context, we emphasize a
systems (dynamics) perspective on ecosystems
(see, e.g., Azoulay, Repenning, & Zuckerman, 2010;
Morecroft, 2007;Repenning&Sterman, 2002; Sterman,
2000). In doing so, we show that firms that want to
win at the ecosystem game need to establish dy-
namic control over the creation process. Specifi-
cally, they need to drawon influencing,monitoring,
and updating strategies to ensure that the emerging
value proposition will evolve in such a way that
control points through which the firm hopes to
capture some of the created value can actually ever
apply. Finally, we highlight how our insights may
hold the potential to provide a fresh view toward
combining more goal-oriented (Gruber et al., 2008,
2013;McGrath&MacMillan, 2000) andmoreprocess-
oriented (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Sarasvathy, 2001;
Sarasvathy, Dew, Read, & Wiltbank, 2008) perspec-
tives of entrepreneurship.
NEW VALUE PROPOSITIONS AND
INNOVATION ECOSYSTEMS
Innovation ecosystems have become a prominent
topic in the strategy and innovation literature
(Adner, Oxley, & Silverman, 2013). First, for in-
creasingly complex products and services that re-
quire the collaboration of multiple parties, we need
new perspectives that allow us to understand how
to create (more) value to existing customers or
create entirely new value propositions altogether
(Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Chesbrough, 2003; Lusch &
Nambisan, 2015; Tilson et al., 2010). Ecosystems are
of practical as well as theoretical interest in this
context, given how this perspective may allow us
to think afresh about how value is created—namely
by consumers choosing certain bundles around a
key value proposition in order to satisfy their idio-
syncratic needs (Priem, 2007). In turn, given their
“mix-and-match” nature, moving to an ecosystem
perspective may fundamentally broaden the het-
erogeneity of customers a company may address
and, hence, the value the firm may create. Second,
ecosystems hold considerable promise for improved
value capture. Driven by direct and indirect network
externalities (e.g., Boudreau, 2010), ecosystems may
evolve—or be steered—in a way that they may gen-
erate substantial abnormal returns to the firms in
control of them (Adner, 2006, 2012; Iansiti & Levien,
2004; Moore, 1996)—with Apple, Google, Intel, or
Microsoft as frequently named successful examples.
Trying to explicate these benefits andhow to reach
them has been the focus of a growing body of aca-
demic as well as practitioner-oriented work. We
identified1 a significantnumberof studiesdiscussing
the design and governance of innovation ecosys-
tems, industry platforms, or multisided markets in
specific industries characterized by disintegrated
value chains and highly heterogeneous demands
(for recent reviews, see also Autio & Thomas, 2013;
Gawer, 2014; Narayanan & Chen, 2012; Thomas
et al., 2014).
However, we also found that those demands are
almost exclusively assumed to be known ex ante,
with all ecosystem stakeholders being aware of them
and each other (and who would be the keystone,
complementors, or suppliers). Hence, existing liter-
ature seems to have posited that the ultimate value
proposition of the to-be-created innovation ecosys-
tem can be constructed following an almost linear
plan. The focus is thus put onquestions of behavioral
maneuvering—which is deduced from the clearly
envisioned future—to ensure this value proposition
will come true and that the focal firm becomes in-
strumental in this process (e.g., Adner & Kapoor,
2010;Ansari, Garud, &Kumaraswamy, 2015;Kapoor
& Furr, 2015; McIntyre & Subramaniam, 2009;
Wareham et al., 2014).2
More specifically, we found that this assumption
may take several forms. A large focus of the literature
rests on customer-facing firms in existing business-
to-consumer (B2C) markets. Of course, these firms
have access to consumer needs and may derive
suitable value propositions as well as strategies for
implementing them. However, when a multilayered
industry is already established, even firms without
such direct customer access, such as Microsoft and
1 Across all major academic and practitioner-oriented
journals, we systematically searched for the words “plat-
form,” “standard,” or “ecosystem.” When the title or ab-
stract of a paper appeared to fit our inquiry, we read the
entire paper, paying particular attention to whether a spe-
cific empirical context had beenpredefined for the study, or
whether assumptions existed about howvalue propositions
could be generated. We proceeded analogously for books.
2 For example, Ansari et al. (2015: 1830) explained how
TiVoovercamecoopetitive tensions to “graft its innovation
into an existing ecosystem.” While the outcomes were
uncertain, the nature of the value proposition and the set of
actors were determined. As Zittrain (2006) argued, TiVo
represents a class of appliances that exploit the gen-
erativity of the deeper layers of the Open Systems In-
terconnection (OSI) hierarchy butwhich are not generative
in themselves.
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Intel, may know what downstream customers ap-
preciate (e.g., Adner, 2012; Casadesus-Masanell &
Yoffie, 2007; Gawer, 2009; Gawer & Cusumano,
2002; Iansiti & Levien, 2004; Kim & Mauborgne,
2005; Williamson & De Meyer, 2012). In short, for
both B2C as well as (originally) business-to-business
firms, the literature has seen the move to the
ecosystem model as a form of business model in-
novation, for which companies have surprisingly
good visibility on what to do and how to get there.
This assumption of good visibility even seems to
have permeated work that has explicitly problemat-
ized the emergence of ecosystems, but which none-
theless has focused on samples of specific successful
applications (e.g., Garnsey, Lorenzoni, & Ferriani,
2008; Hannah & Eisenhardt, 2015; Soh, 2010).
As a result, recent literature has suggested that it
can present clear guidance on behavioral maneu-
vering to establish the ecosystem blueprint (see also
Adner, 2012; Baldwin &Clark, 2000; Edelman, 2015;
Iansiti & Levien, 2004), as we summarize in Figure 1.
Firms clearly understand which assets they can
leverage in ecosystems and derive a concomitant
design of technological and social interdependencies
by selecting the right partners (Adner, 2012; Adner &
Kapoor, 2010, 2016; Kapoor & Furr, 2015; Kapoor &
Lee, 2013). Alternatively, they discover technologies
and industry-level value systems or architectures as
given sets of interdependencies in which they need
to identify and occupy the strategic bottlenecks to
attain control (Baldwin, 2015; Baldwin & Woodard,
2007; Hannah & Eisenhardt, 2015; Iansiti & Levien,
2004; Jacobides & Tae, 2015; Pagani, 2013) (Figure 1,
arrow A). Having defined such control points for
value capture, firms can build an internal business
case for resource investment and create a set of ap-
propriate tactics (arrow B). These, in turn, are applied
(arrow C) to potential complementors and suppliers
identified via strategic interdependencies (arrow D).
These tactics would particularly aim to ensure syn-
chrony (Davis, 2013)—i.e., that external partners will
be producing those inputs required for the value
propositions, and at the right time (e.g., Davis, 2016;
Wareham et al., 2014). In this way, the ecosystem
can iteratively build up momentum according to
the rhythm of the focal firm (arrows E↔ C).
In this paper, we argue that these insights need
to be substantially extended before they can apply
to companies considering establishing a new in-
novation ecosystem around a broadly applicable
technology, such as a generative technology at the
deep end of a multilayered industry architecture
(Jacobides, Knudsen, & Augier, 2006; Yoo et al.,
2010). The example of the IBM PC provides a case in
point (e.g., Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Bresnahan &
Greenstein, 1999; Gawer & Cusumano, 2002): IBM,
not exactly a B2C company, followed precisely the
above blueprint-based process when designing the
distributed PC architecture—a value proposition
that was completely novel to the market at that time.
The bottleneck IBM identified was the so-called
BIOS, a piece that was quickly reverse engineered
by other players—a move IBM had not anticipated.
In addition, players chosen by IBM to join their
ecosystem—first and foremost, Intel and Microsoft—
started their own maneuvering efforts toward a dif-
ferently structured value proposition, eventually
pushing IBM out of most of the PC market.
In our view, the IBM example should not be seen
as a case of poor ex ante planning, but as represen-
tative of a general problem: in the linear, near-
deterministic case presented by current literature,
companies are seen to be able to define a prioriwhere
to make investments in such a way that couplings
between parts of the ecosystem are maximized, and
asset specificity is high.Hence, companies supposedly
know ex ante how to achieve control, in particular
by building or acquiring hard-to-circumvent comple-
mentary assets (Teece, 1986). Given the assumed ac-
curacyof theblueprint, once thevalueproposition is in
place, customers, complementors, and competitors
will then have little other option but to play according
to the rules set by the keystone player.
Conversely, we propose that once you go deeper
into the technological architecture, suchaswhennew
technological breakthroughs are achieved, general-
purpose technologies invented, or standards to be
defined, this assumption of visibility may need to
FIGURE 1
Ecosystem Design According to Extant Literature
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be reconsidered (see also Jain, 2012; Le Masson,
Weil, &Hatchuel, 2009; Mo¨ller, 2010; Sull, 2005), for
three reasons.
First, firmswill find it hard to prespecify the value
proposition, as, for them, ecosystem design implies
processing endless combinations among unknow-
able options (Anderson, 1999; Dougherty & Dunne,
2011). When no consumer-facing products using the
technology or no information channels to the (yet-
unknown) customers currently exist, no single value
proposition can be clearly determined to guide re-
source commitment. Second, given the uncertainty
and contestability of the actual realization of the
ecosystem idea, firms will struggle to find others to
support it and make the required resource commit-
ments (e.g., Ozcan & Santos, 2015). Finally, even if
the firm somehow manages to create the value
proposition in the market, the assumption of pre-
specifiable, strong interdependencies and control
points of the linear model does not need to hold, as
highlighted by the IBMexample: in anymultilayered
industry, in particular one built on digital technolo-
gies, once the value proposition is accepted in
the market, players further downstream may dis-
cover alternate enabling technologies, allowing them
to circumvent the original platform creator (e.g.,
Lieberman &Montgomery, 1998; Suarez & Lanzolla,
2005). As a result, even ecosystem initiators who
succeed in getting to the market may find them-
selves left with a “fortress in the desert:” a set of
preidentified control points and concomitant re-
source investments (possibly even by partners),
which are now of almost no value, and which other
players, some of whom the firm may have originally
imagined tobe “complementors”or “suppliers,”will
find easy to circumvent.
Consequently, in this paper we ask how a firm
can simultaneously steer a collective process to
discover and implement a complex value propo-
sition via an innovation ecosystem while also
ensuring that it will benefit from the fruits of
the collective effort. We believe that this inquiry is
essential to improving our understanding of how
firmsmay successfully introduce novel innovation
ecosystems that leverage the generativity of new-
to-the-world technology, and create entirely new
markets around previously often unimaginable
value propositions.
DATA AND METHODS
Given that the earliest stages of ecosystem crea-
tion remain largely unexplored in the literature,
we follow a qualitative approach (Edmondson &
McManus, 2007). The aim of our open-ended in-
ductive inquiry (Eisenhardt, 1989; Langley, 1999)
is to disentangle the process dynamics of simulta-
neously creating and establishing control over an
ecosystem when the customer-facing value prop-
osition is yet unknown, with a particular focus on
the causal structure of interactions and temporal
feedbacks (Gioia et al., 2013; Strauss & Corbin,
1998). To increase the external validity of our
substantive theory, we use an embedded multiple-
case study research design (Leonard-Barton, 1990).
We follow a logic of literal replication (Yin, 2014)
whereby we expect the identification of em-
pirical regularities across contemporary cases to
provide a contextualized explanation with a
strong emphasis on theory (Tsang, 2013; Tsang &
Williams, 2012).
Data Collection and Case Selection
During the first phase, beginning in mid-2008, we
engaged (Van de Ven, 2007) with 10 technology-
based multinationals—from aerospace, automotive,
chemicals, defense, electronics, industrial equip-
ment, IT, and telecommunications—to learn about
their perceived challenges with innovation ecosys-
tems and the relevance of our research questions.
This exploratory work included 25 interviews, usu-
ally with the chief technology officer (CTO) or a vice
president (VP) including 11 interviews with the two
companies selected for our case studies, a research
workshopwith one firm (three top-level executives),
and a research symposiumwith four firms (nine top-
level executives).
In the second phase, which lasted from late 2008
to mid-2010, we focused our in-depth work on two
of these 10 companies because of their suitability as
objects of study, as well as our success in negotiating
deep access at corporate level. For confidentiality
reasons, we label our two case firms “Green” and
“Red.” Green and Red are world leaders in the IT
and telecommunication industries, respectively. To
cope with heterogeneous customer demands and
enhance perceived value, both firms had to develop
ecosystems to continuously innovate and upgrade
their products and services. This data forms the core
of our analysis.
For our literal-replication multiple-case design,
we studied, for each firm, two recent and ongoing
cases of innovation ecosystem creation. The em-
bedded cases were selected among several ecosys-
tem creation attempts we identified together with
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Green’s CTO and Red’s head of research. Other
potential cases were too embryonic and, given the
timescale of ecosystem creation (short of 10 years),
a longitudinal study was not practical. We thus se-
lected cases that were sufficiently advanced for our
process research but which were nonetheless re-
cent and ongoing, while ensuring our results could
also explain all other attempts of which we had
learned.
In addition, in the third phase from mid to late
2010, we conducted three final research workshops
to check the internal validity of our preliminary
findings: two firm-specific research workshops with
each firm and a final symposiumwith key informants
from Red and Green.
Data Sources
For our four cases, we rely on a combination of
primary interview data and secondary archival data.
We can draw on 48 interviews from Red and Green,
including top-level and middle managers and core
technical specialists (see Table 1). We took care
not to lead informants. We did not follow a dyadic
design, which would have included primary data
from other ecosystem partners. Rather, we sought
practical utility in our problem-driven theoriz-
ing (Corley & Gioia, 2011) and focused the semi-
structured interviews on managerial agency in our
case firms during the creation of these four inno-
vation ecosystems.
We were permitted to record 21 interviews;
we always took very detailed notes during and
immediately after all the conversations, making
sure to record informants’ exact words. We wrote
memos for each interview to adjust the interview
questions as the research progressed, in particular
to disentangle complex interdependencies and
to get concrete accounts of who did what when.
For all cases, we interviewed several informants
multiple times to explore emerging issues. The
lead authorwas present in 45 of the interviews, two
interviews were conducted by the third author,3
and 31 were conducted as a team. The second au-
thor did not participate in the data collection,
which allowed us to maintain the high-level out-
sider perspective required for informed and un-
biased theorizing (Gioia et al., 2013; Mantere &
Ketokivi, 2013). In total, we collected over 400
single-spaced pages of transcripts plus 200 pages
of notes.
The secondary data amount to over 1,500 pages
of all relevant strategic notes, reports, and market
forecasts, as well as highly detailed specifications
and licensing agreements for the different technol-
ogies involved. In addition, we gathered videos or
graphical representations by various stakeholders
of their envisioned ecosystems. These documents
allowed us to capture both the origins of the re-
spective ecosystems and how the way they were
envisioned and evolved.
Our rich data allows us to follow a triangulation
approach (Jick, 1979): by drawing on the same in-
terview participants repeatedly, by cross-checking
statements across interviews and across informants,
and by verifying them against secondary data, we
mitigated the risk of recall bias and validated the
plausibility of their accounts. Further, we con-
structed four elaborate case narratives, which we
circulated to our key informants. This led to the
correction of a few factual errors, such as specific
dates of events. In addition, the dedicated follow-up
workshops with each firm (Red: 21 participants;
Green: six) and a closing workshop (five top-level
executives from both firms) in the third phase fur-
ther corroborated the validity of our preliminary
findings.
Data Analysis
We followed the method described by Gioia and
colleagues (2013). As is customary in such process
research, interviewing and analyzing initially pro-
ceeded concurrently during the three phases of data
collection. This led to an initial list of first-order
concepts emerging from the data. As we iterated be-
tween coding and data collection, our theorizing
started to focus on two ideas: dealing with un-
certainty and maintaining control over the ecosys-
tem creation.
The first and second authors only began in-depth
process analysis across the four embedded cases
once all data had been collected and the case narra-
tives verified. We discussed our respective inter-
pretations, then refined the coding procedure and
recoded the entire dataset at a more granular level to
better capture how managers acted based on their
anticipation of a fundamentally uncertain future.
We then followed a process of constant comparison
of first-order codes, grouped them into second-
order themes according to their inferred roles in the
3 One interview with Green did not feature a member of
the research team, but was generously shared by a col-
league who had previously assisted us in establishing
access to the firm.
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process, and synthesized them into aggregate di-
mensions. We then collectively went back to the
relevant literature and cycled between the data,
the emerging findings, and existing theory to check
whetherwehaddiscoverednovel concepts (Corley&
Gioia, 2011; Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013; Strauss &
Corbin, 1998).We integrated prior concepts from the
literature and the ones we discovered into a novel
framework to reveal their relational dynamicsduring
de novo ecosystem creation (Corley & Gioia, 2011).
This iterative analysis resulted in the data structure
presented in Figure 2.
Finally, we used the data not only to induce cat-
egories, but also to generate a dynamic explanation
(see also, e.g., Azoulay et al., 2010; Morecroft, 2007;
Repenning & Sterman, 2002; Sterman, 2000) of
ecosystem creation. To do so, we identified causal
links among second-order themes and returned to
the data to confirm each link’s existence and po-
larity. The themes and causal links among them,
which are both tightly grounded in our data and
internally consistent, form the feedback processes
that generate the dynamics of ecosystem creation
(see Figure 8).
CASE OVERVIEW
Before presenting our findings, we briefly describe
each innovation ecosystem.
Green—Jade
In the early 1990s, Green developed a technology
based on wavelength data multiplexing (WDM)
compatible with their proprietary high-end systems.
As fiber optics networkswere being deployed, Green
thought that one of many potential future applica-
tions for Jade could be to synchronize datacenters
in metropolitan area networks. However, at the
time this customer-level application required fur-
ther technological developments in thedeeper layers
of the digital infrastructure. Green first developed
a proprietary product that it sold to a few selected
clients. This created a novel market. Soon, telecom
equipment companies entered with their own
products and rapidly improved the performance of
theWDMtechnology, but their products could not fit
into Green’s high-end application. Green started to
realize that, even if it was a “critical enabler” for this
kind of higher-level value proposition, its WDM
component was not part of its core business. Green
would quickly become the “bottleneck” given the
pace of innovation in this technology. In 1999, Green
thus decided to meet with the four best telecom
equipment companies and selected one as its single-
supplier for the component under a licensing and
rebranding agreement. However, Green kept key
aspects of the technology secret.
By 2003, the market was growing rapidly. Other
equipment companies started requesting access to
Green’s technology to enter the lucrative high-end.
As one of Green’s VPs told us, the company’s initial
reaction was “no, why do we need you?” Yet, novel
specialized applications quickly emerged in an in-
creasingly heterogeneous market. Green realized
that this heterogeneity created unexpected exter-
nalities with telecom equipment, drawing on which
it could capture “revenue drags” by selling more
of their high-end solutions to new clients. Green
committed to this strategy, clarified its vision for the
ecosystem, and licensed Jade to a limited number of
partners. Since then, the ecosystem has grown to the
seven largest telecom equipment companies.
Green—Emerald
During the dotcom period, Green noticed tech-
nological innovations in local and storage area
networks that could lead to dense, scalable server
systems with high-speed networking. However, the
architecture for these compact, cableless servers did
not exist yet. Given the development cost of an en-
tirely novel platform and the lack of a reference from
which to extrapolate market estimates, there was no
business case. In 1999, a “skunkworks” team was
allowed to explore the potential characteristics of
such a system. Engaging with Green marketing and
selected customers, theypresented abusiness case to
the executives in 2000, which led to a proprietary
product in 2002. In 2004, Green started single-
sourcing specific components.
Many unanticipated applications of economical
high-performance computing emerged in areas such
as finance, digital media, and decision support.
Green realized that the broad range of new applica-
tions required a variety of advanced customer-end
complements. Again, Green could not afford to be-
come the innovation bottleneck. In 2006, sensing
the addressable heterogeneity, Green drafted a pos-
sible ecosystem and decided to open its deep-layer
architecture to specialist firms. With eight partners,
Green created an industry association to promote
this architecture, to manage the evolving specifica-
tions, to roadmap desired innovations, and to set up
independent certification tests. By 2008, third-party
vendors could develop and sell their owncompatible
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FIGURE 2
Data Structure
First-Order Concepts Second-Order Themes Aggregate Dimensions
Protovision
Envisioned
Blueprint
Enacted
Resonance
Dynamic
Control
Updating
Monitoring
Influencing
External
Momentum
Internal
Momentum
Envisioned
Interdependencies
Envisioned
Control Points
Alternative Futures
Enabling Technology
A critical technology enabler
A radically novel architecture
Understanding the requirements
Testing the design assumptions
Dreaming about the future/develop a vision
Uncertainty is so high
Clarifying vision of what the system should do
Economics of the game: multitude of uses/develop diversity
Anticipated hub of the future
Parts we want to keep for ourselves/family jewels
Strong competencies (maybe not yet, but in the future)
Leverage a position/control point in an area
Need to bring innovation to address heterogeneity
Need for complementary products and services
Leave to others what is not important to us
Go outside the company
Need to work with many partners/ecosystem arrangements
Developing an internal business case
Selling the project to the main lines of business
Aligning expectations of many internal stakeholders
Versatility in products/faster reaction to new requirements
Demonstrating the interest of external companies
Selective collaboration/how they see it
Bring along partners without misleading them
Engage few selected customers to test the vision
A vast market; an opportunity with no solution yet
High enthusiasm among early participants
Partners looking for volume/access to clients
Enabler for their own markets
Convince others/drive towards a common vision
Market power of the company
Channel the environment in a direction you can profit from
Voting power over architecture specifications
Vetting of partners/certification processes
Inter-lock meeting/sharing of roadmaps
Showcase days/forums/scanning
Synthetic view of technical trends and directions
Requirements and specifications evolved based on feedback
Changed the influencing tactics
Things turned out differently than initially planned
Changed the business case for the ecosystem
Joint-review boards, architecture review boards
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products. Green “never foresaw the impact [Emerald]
would have on datacenter infrastructure.” The eco-
system has since grown to over 100 firms offering
components for specific applications.
Red—Ruby
Around 2001, Red researchers “had a vision” that
the mobile phone may one day play a central role in
providing connectivity to a multitude of sensors,
accessories, and specialty devices. The company
imagined many distributed sensors would be col-
lecting real-world data to create new user-level ser-
vices. Given technical constraints, these sensors did
not yet have the underlying connectivity to directly
transmit data. A new enabling technology was re-
quired to transform the mobile phone into a true
gateway. Red started preliminary discussions with
engineers at two companies specialized in small
devices to learn about the processing and commu-
nication needs of sensors in these devices. It also
asked them “what do you think?” and “could this be
of interest to you?” With these companies and two
universities, Red researched the requirements and
initial architecture for the technology. In 2004, the
whole Ruby package was functional.
During these collaborations, Red realized that its
mobile-phone-centric vision was still appropriate,
but the use cases that had emerged were different
from those anticipated. Between 2004 and 2006,
Red and its partners launched another research
project to imagine future use cases for context
awareness and to develop the required sensors. In-
ternally, Red’s business lines had not been in-
terested in integrating Ruby in their products. Red’s
strategy was shifting: the proprietary business case
for Ruby was dropped. Ruby was rescued in 2005
by a business development team, which instead
imagined a licensing model—for which they ob-
tained lukewarm support from Red executives.
Ruby managers tried to win over small-devices
firms to set up an ecosystem of connectable devices.
For two years, Ruby managers performed a “bal-
ancing act” to convince both their internal stake-
holders and selected external partners to commit to
Ruby, and of simultaneously clarifying their vision
for the ecosystem of user-level devices. By the end
of 2006, Red had gathered 14 small-device firms
and was receiving just enough licensing fees to
cover coordination costs. However, the large semi-
conductor companies were still needed to create
a complete ecosystem: Redmanagersmade changes
to the deep-layer technology and updated the
licensing agreement. At the end of 2007, through
a successful “poker move” the Ruby ecosystem
was merged into an existing consortium favored by
the dominant firms. By 2010, Ruby, for which Red
owned key patents, was at last available as an
enabler for the “Internet of Things.”
Red—Coral
In the early 2000s, Red realized that its product
architecture had become so monolithic and tightly
coupled that Red’s product development had to
predict its future products’ specifications and in-
dicate clear requirements to semiconductor sup-
pliers five to six years ahead. This rigidity created
a lock-in situation, preventing the integration of in-
novations that emerged close to product launch. At
this stage, “nobody wants to touch it anymore. Be-
cause when you actually get that kind of animal to
work, you can’t touch [it] anymore.” In 2004, Red
started the total redesign of its system into amodular
architecture to facilitate the (even adhoc) integration
of innovations by multiple vendors. At the end of
2005, Red had developed the basics of its Coral
architecture.
Red rapidly understood that the success of Coral
required more than solving deep-layer technical is-
sues. The overall approach of sourcing components
from third parties and integrating user-level func-
tionalitieswouldonly be successful if the technology
vendors were adopting Coral as well. In 2006, Red
visited 15 companies worldwide to present the im-
portance of Coral in a “horizontalized” industry. Red
was probing these vendors’ reactions and obtained
initial commitment from 10 companies to experi-
mentwith pilots. As Red’s strategywas shifting away
frombeing apure technology firm, it didnot perceive
Coral as a direct source of value capture but rather as
an enabler for its future differentiation strategy.
Given the ecosystem it could envision, Red decided
to transfer the technology to the vendors under an
open license as a preemptive move to prevent any-
one else owning this “architectural control point.”
From its vantage position, Red collected feedback
and acted as the editor of the vendors’ requests for
changes in the core. By the end of 2007, Red took the
unilateral decision to freeze the Coral architecture.
From 2008, Red began building up momentum
around Coral by launching a website, organizing
conferences, and talking to its direct competitors to
get them onboard. As new sensors and connectivity,
such as Ruby, became available, it became clearer
that the Coral multilayered architecture and its
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service-level APIs could enable many “rich context
services.”
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL MODEL OF
ECOSYSTEM CREATION
Against the backdrop of the case events sketched
above, we found that the process of ecosystem crea-
tion, with a timespan short of a decade, involved
a much higher level of uncertainty, reciprocal com-
mitment, and ongoing adjustment than has been
depicted in the literature. Across Green and Red,
several informants described the different phases of
“developing a new ecosystem that doesn’t currently
exist” as “an ecosystem game.” The head of business
development at Red described the challenges of
ecosystem creation as a
very difficult question: it’s both a creative process that
you think creatively what can be done but then it’s
also in the management roles: if you don’t knowwhat
you want to reach you can’t deploy.
Given the timespan, the uncertainty, all players’
creative agency, and the increasing path depen-
dency, we found that ecosystem creation requires
a dynamic approach:
So you kind of have a long-term role in yourmind and
in the end it’s, you know, “what’s the game?”We’re in
this fast-moving services-driven business, it’s more
like poker. So you create options for the future busi-
nesses. There’s always a new hand coming [. . .] it’s
a very organic model. (Red)
Below,wedescribe the inceptionprocess common
to these ecosystems. We explain how an initially
broad protovision crystallized, through mutual en-
gagement and increasing commitment, into a more
clarified blueprint of interdependencies. In this
context, our findings show that the creation of a de
novo ecosystem is an ongoing process of managing
coupled feedback loops. Some feedback loops en-
trench the ecosystem trajectory by narrowing the
range of alternative futures, forcing the focal firm to
keep up with ecosystem dynamics, roadmapping
or preempting positions, and enacting resonance
among internal and external stakeholders. However,
other feedback loops cause the ecosystem to drift
unexpectedly, dissolve the emerging blueprint, and
threaten the firm’s future control points. We now
demonstrate these fundamental feedback loops,
which we progressively capture in Figures 3 to 7,
and bring together in Figure 8. Appendix A contains
further details and lays out how Red and Green
attempted to exert dynamic control in each phase.
Narrowing the Future
In the four cases, the inception of the ecosystem
can be traced back to the late 1990s or early 2000s,
but it took five to 10 years to build an innovation
ecosystem. In the cases of Emerald, Ruby, and Coral,
it was the perception of plausible future applications
or “use cases” that led the firms to develop the
foundations for the required technology. In the case
of Jade, the process started with a technological in-
novation at the infrastructure level upon which
Green managers imagined an initial service-level
application. Still, in all cases themanagers described
each technology as a critical “enabler” for many
potential service-level applications, which were
embedded relatively deep in the sector’s technolog-
ical architecture, facilitating and supporting a sheer,
limitless set of functionalities that could eventually
be bundled to customer-facing offerings.
For the other companies WDM was a core business,
forGreen itwas an enabler. . . anenabler for thiswhole
solution . . . an enabler for larger solutions. (Green
Jade)
The current economics of [Emerald] technology en-
able these IT organizations to launch new business
applications in a timely, competitive, and cost-
sensitive business environment. (Green)
You are able to create, distribute functionality [. . .]
between modules [in a way] that was not possible
before. So this kind of technology enabled this kind of
disruption. [. . .] It’s a key enabler [. . .] for solutions
with many different pieces, kind of Internet-based
services components and diverse clients. It enabled
new players to provide the technologies to that ar-
chitecture. (Red Coral)
This technology was an enabler for new functional-
ities in consumer goods. (Red Ruby)
Although everyone recognized the potential
of these deep-layer innovations, these enabling
technologies opened up a broad range of possible
service-level applications far into the futurewithno
indication of what, where, or why the firm should
prioritize at present. As stated by onemanager, they
were faced with a “mind-blowing space of explo-
ration.” Managers said they were “dreaming about
the future” when trying to articulate initial proto-
visions: a space of connected future options enabled
by the technology that seemed both feasible as
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well as potentially lucrative to the focal firm. Yet
managers knew just how uncertain these proto-
visions were:
It’s very complicated to think about optionswhen you
don’t even have the first step, but you need to go there
thinking what is the domino effect. If I do this where
could it lead to?Uncertainty is so high that even if you
do great options analysis as desk study, it’s still about
how you execute. (Red)
Understanding the limits of their ownknowledge,
managers tried to engagewith selected trusted clients
and potential partners to probe their perspectives.
Green managers used this feedback to hone in on
more specific applications and integrated the re-
quired features into proprietary products, although
the development teams had to “pull together imagi-
native solutions to address areas that had not been
anticipated.” Red managers engaged with some ex-
ternal partners, whom they could project into a range
of alternative futures, to understand the technical
issues to be addressed across the “very holistic con-
cepts created by [Red]:”
Research in context awareness and [Ruby] started
maybe [in] ’98. [. . .] We wanted to understand what
are the requirements for [Ruby] technology [. . .] and
what are the typical use cases they envision in the
future. We had this sort of vision in 2001. The vision
was somehow embedded in the requirement of the
use caseswehave, and then that’s derived to do a kind
of a more detailed specification for the work and so
on. (Red Ruby; emphasis added)
We started this kind of research base collaboration
already, so that we get all the feedback. We can in-
troduce the concept, they have time to learn it and to
build some demonstrations, together with us, and do
some prototypes. (Red Coral)
Such engagement with partners narrowed down the
range of potentially valuable and connected alternative
futures. In essence, similar to the logic of abduction
(e.g., Dunne & Dougherty, 2016; Mantere & Ketokivi,
2013; Peirce, 1878), managers understood that they
could not predict one future value proposition, but that
they could make efforts to reduce the uncertainty as-
sociatedwith theirprotovisionsanditerativelydiscover
whether they remained a possibility.4 Thus, while
neither specific nor final, the emerging protovisions
gave increasingly clearer direction for developing the
technology in such away as to arrive, potentially, at an
evennarrower range of future applications.At the same
time, learning about intended as well as unforeseen
areas of application allowed the firms to better un-
derstand what each enabling technology could be
about, aswell ashowtopotentiallydevelop it further, to
discover new, more refined applications:
We understood while doing the work that the most
important use cases are different than what we an-
ticipated at the start. [. . .] to be honest, when we
started [we had] some assumptions about the use
cases, and we were totally wrong... because the time
span is so long that when we started in 2001 and then
the technologies [will be] adopted [until] maybe [. . .]
2009, 2010, [we had] certain assumptions about
[what] the future will look like and how things [will
be] operating at that time. (Red Ruby)
The state of development of these enabling tech-
nologies was coextensivewith the range of imagined
futures. An unbounded range of alternative futures
decreased the state of an enabling technology rela-
tive to the implied requirements. Conversely, as
an enabling technology evolved and its tradeoffs
became clearer, path dependencies limited its gen-
erativity and the range of plausible futures narrowed
down. Figure 3 captures this nondeterministic rein-
forcing process.
Shifting to and Keeping up with
Ecosystem Dynamics
With the deep-layer enablers progressing and the
range of alternative futures narrowing, Green and
Red managers attempted to explore how their com-
panies could pursue these opportunities.
The objective is not to discuss the technology because
the technology is there, but to actually imagine and
design what the business model can be, what is the
value proposition and who pays for what. (Green)
FIGURE 3
Narrowing the Future
State of 
ENABLING 
TECHNOLOGY
Range of 
ALTERNATIVE 
FUTURES
–
–
R1
Narrowing the 
f uture
4 As Peirce (1878, cited in Locke, Golden-Biddle, &
Feldman, 2008: 907) originally put it: “deduction proves
that something must be; induction shows that something
actually is operative; abduction merely suggests that
somethingmay be” (emphasis in original).
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So the technology was there and we started thinking
about,what canwedowith this, the valueproposition
[. . .] we perceived therewas value in [it] but we didn’t
know how to proceed with [it], how to get [the tech-
nology] out there, to create value with [it]. (Red)
Interestingly, neither company started with the idea
of creating an ecosystem.Rather, acrossRedandGreen
it was the demonstration of an external pull from se-
lected external partners that convinced internal exec-
utives to switch to an ecosystemmodel. To enable the
switch, Red and Green managers had to create drafts
of their envisioned ecosystem blueprints. These, how-
ever, were not deterministic implementation guide-
lines, but vague and living documents that still had
lots of blanks regarding what value was to be created
eventually, and how to capture some of it.
For both Jade and Emerald, Green had originally
introduced a proprietary product. With its wider
diffusion heterogeneous applications and customer
needs emerged, which each required unanticipated
technological developments. These externalities forced
Green to realize it could not remain the “bottleneck
in the innovation process.” Thus, Green carefully
selected suppliers to single-source the design and
manufacturing of specific components around the
protovision. Yet, Jade customers, who “want to have
some ability to cause competition to drive prices
down,” started saying that they “like freedom at least
to have pieces of this puzzle where we decide who
will be the vendor.” For Emerald, emerging appli-
cations also required specialized components in
which Green had little expertise. As a Green VP told
us, in both cases these interactions “led to the dy-
namic exchange of new ideas and rapid market
learning” and the realization that “certain features
can only be delivered with all companies working
together.” This increasing pull from external firms
convinced Green executives to adopt an ecosystem
model.
At the same time that customersweredemandingmore
choice, other companies were approaching [us] with
interest in forming their own partnerships, including
access to their WDM innovations in exchange for both
[Green’s] technology and marketing support. (Green)
People do come along and knock on the door and say,
“can I play?” [. . .] We weren’t set up to deal with that
and so that helped motivate us to go into an ecosys-
tem. [. . .] By licensing our technology to multiple
vendors [. . .] we were able to address emerging cus-
tomer requirements. (Green Jade)
In contrast, Redmanagers had to actively build this
externalpull.GivenRed’s strategy at the time, existing
business units resisted embedding Ruby or Coral into
theirproduct lines, soRubyandCoralmanagers could
notdemonstratebusinesscases todevelopproprietary
products.Redmanagers themselvescouldnotyet“see
exactly how we are going to earn more money by
selling those.” As Red executives were “stopping the
whole thing,” Ruby and Coral initiated the switch to
an ecosystem approach, even though they could not
yet clearly envision what it would be:
The [internal] responsewegotwas [. . .] “overmydead
body!” [. . .] So then we just started building an alter-
native model for it. Based on the discussions that
[informant] had started with external stakeholders,
it was clear to us that there was interest; we weren’t
the only oneswho thought that [. . .] therewas value in
this type of technology. (Red)
Ruby is anexampleofwherewe thought that, “yes,we
need to build the ecosystem” [. . .] But we cannot
identify what is the ecosystem of that, who would be
the players there, and, therefore, we cannot convince
our management to go with that plan. (Red)
At this stage of the inception process, the key
question became “how do you actually make it
happen?” A Red manager described that at that mo-
ment, and with no clear blueprint in hand, their
“strategy was more, well, let’s see what happens.”
Specifically, Red managers started presenting their
broad protovision to external companies. The aim
was to probe their interests, to refine the envisioned
blueprint, and to convince these externals to commit
some initial resources by highlighting how emerging
interdependencies represented business opportuni-
ties for those firms—as Red hoped to delay its own
commitment until a clear opportunity emerged.
Many people say that when you mention the word
ecosystem you are already in trouble; it’s not an easy
business. Youneed to convince others to do their own
businesses [sic]. (Red)
What I was actually trying to do was present a vision,
the mobile phone becoming the hub for devices com-
municatingwith each other and to the internet and then
telling them there’s hundreds of millions of devices
potentially in the future which can do that. (Red Ruby)
The ideawas thatwebasically convince themthat this
is interesting enough for them that they should actu-
ally put some resources on this one [. . .] thenwe try to
obtain some reasonably loose target [. . .] so we had to
sell the idea for them, because we were asking for
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them to put effort and money on this prototyping
stage, without any promises on any business oppor-
tunities. (Red Coral)
Like Green, Red managers engaged with potential
partners in a highly selective manner:
I talked to 10 or 15. But I was selective, so I wasn’t
talking to everybody. I picked from each of the in-
dustries, the top three, like PC or sports accessories,
watches. . . and I picked the two or three largest, big-
gest companies and talked to those. (Red Ruby)
However, not all external companies welcomed
our firms’ protovisions. Red’s existing technology
providers perceived the Coral-envisioned interde-
pendencies as a threat to their existing business.
The discussions with the existing partners, strategic
collaborators, whatever you call them, they were much
more difficult, because they saw that this might harm
their business [. . .], because it might change their busi-
ness landscape. They were not on the forefront to try to
put a lot of resources to work on this thing. (Red Coral)
Similarly, Red’s large semiconductor suppliers
initially resisted adopting the Ruby technology:
Through the discussions with the semiconductor
vendors, we realized that those who were very
entrenched into the [existing standard] technology
and were manufacturing those chipsets, they felt
threatened, whereas those challengers who were not
manufacturing [existing standard] chips, that were
not leading players in that industry, but wanted to be,
were very interested. (Red Ruby)5
In our four cases, by showing the external pull
from potential partners with whom they could en-
vision collaborating across a range of alternative fu-
tures, our managers tried to convince the executives
at their firms to play the ecosystem game and to
support further developments.
You need to create the external pull and market pull,
when you really need to collect together the different
players, not just end customers but other stakeholders
in the business whowould have their own businesses
andmake thewhole ecosystempossible. And Iwould
say that the most important thing is to be able to ar-
ticulate the internal business case. This is the key
thing in your examples, like [Coral] or [Ruby]. (Red)
In order to convince our product lines we need to go
outside the company to find these. . . especially product
brands here, [famous brands] and whatnot, whoever
thosecompanies are, andget a tick inabox toget themto
say, that,“yes, it’s important,wewant toworkwithRed;”
and then we established the link here between them
and the product line so that our product line’s got the
visibility that, “yes, there are these external companies
who want to have this.” (Red Ruby)
With this switch made, it became immediately
evident that Red and Green had to change their per-
spectives from predicting specific applications on
their own to understanding and keeping up with
ongoing developments around them, andwhat these
meant for the companies’ enabling technologies, so
that they could continuously keep abreast of the
emerging ecosystem dynamics.
We focus a little bitmore in understandingwhat is going
on in this development there, and trying to understand
what are the most essential scientific typically challeng-
ing problems in that new ecosystem, where we can also
kind of gain momentum by creating new technology
enablers. [. . .] There are a lot of disruptive elements in
there. So, that automatically influences [. . .] the value
network. We definitely don’t understand what will
happen. (Red)
Building on these observations, Figure 4 shows
the set of relationships we posit, and captures a pre-
liminary reinforcing feedback loop whereby the
initial commitment of resources by some external
firms inscribed a certain, albeit unpredictable, di-
rection to the ecosystem dynamics.
Roadmapping and Preempting
While the switch to the ecosystem model helped
further narrow down potential applications and
partners, uncertainty was still high concerning what
the emerging ecosystem blueprint, out of a broad
range that remained plausible, would be. Even
though our managers did not yet know what value
they would eventually create with the ecosystem,
they still somehow had to define their firms’ ability
to create and capture value in the future, in order to:
(1) know where to steer development of “their”
ecosystem (a process we label roadmapping) for
eventual value capture; and (2) identify unwanted
developments of others’ value capture in their eco-
system and prevent them from taking shape (pre-
empting). Aswe showbelow, these dynamics helped
clarify a suitable distribution of roles for an in-
creasingly narrow envisioned blueprint, so that
5 Beyondour cases, Greenpresented a vision ofmachine
learning to a manufacturer. As Green realized it could not
build the business alone, and could not even coerce that
firm into playing ball, it ceded this opportunity.
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ecosystem players could further converge toward
one common vision.
Managers quickly realized that the switch to the
ecosystem model required them to give up on the
idea of complete proprietary control that had driven
many of their initial developments:while ownership
of the entire system required for delivering a value
proposition would be the best way to control the
direction and rate of innovation and, ultimately,
value capture, market heterogeneity and resource
constraints forced the focal firms to make strategic
tradeoffs:
Interviewee #1: “The best way to do it is to own ev-
erything from end to end, to be perfectly honest.”
Interviewer: “But what does ownership bring you?”
Interviewee #2: “You can do whatever you want.”
Interviewee #1 (at the same time): “Control.”
Interviewee #2: “If I decide I want to introduce
[technology for Jade] this year, I will introduce it. I
don’t care what anybody else says. I set the agenda.
There are tradeoffs that you make on flexibility with
respect to development investment vs. control. [. . .] If
I had themoney todo that, Iwoulddo everything from
end to end. The question is how much control do we
want to take on that? (Green)
To gain value from the ecosystem game, managers
told us that they would need to identify and capture
control points, which one manager described as
“critical points [where] most of the value is created
through your position.” They also understood that
these control points had to be amoving target (Pagani,
2013; Tilson et al., 2010): in contrast to existing
management literature (e.g., Adner, 2006, 2012;
Baldwin & Woodard, 2007; Williamson & De Meyer,
2012), we find that the identification of future, de-
fensible bottlenecks or control points through road-
mappingwasnot static,butwascontinuously inferred
from the crystallizing blueprint, dependent on the
firm’s strategy and available resources at the time,
and not necessarily linked to direct value capture.
Specifically, managers were faced with a catch 22:
without knowingwhat the future value createdwould
be, they could not make reliable investments in the
present to make both value creation and capture
happen. Yet any investment they would make to cre-
ate that future may have turned out to be incorrect,
given they could not know the full space of potential
future ecosystems at any point in time. Indeed, given
the timescale and the level of uncertainty induced by
the creative agency of multiple actors during ecosys-
tem creation, managers expressed that they had to
carefully evaluate the risks of false positives and
negatives in identifying future control points:
I don’t know that you knew for every part of it what
was, you know, 10 years from now going to be
attacked or not. But it was clear enoughwhat wewere
trying to do that you could say to me “we could go
have people go do these things.” (Green)
Whenever you do that, there’s always a, “well, hang
on, is that going towreck our business?” Imean,we’ve
got to just, kind of, check that, right? (Green)
You never know what happens during the 10 years.
There is always new technology coming which will
disrupt the old technology. Are we betting now our-
selves [on] a technologywhichwill come to thedevice
in 10 years?Wedon’t even know if Redwill exist in 10
years anymore. (Red)
The course of action chosen by managers in this
situation is again reminiscent of abductive search:
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rather than backward-inducing one chain of action
for the present based on a clear vision for the future,
they tried to further narrow down the range of pro-
mising possible futures, including vague control
points, based on their revised understanding of the
generic enablers and the reduced set of heteroge-
neous applications. As some managers explained:
In an ecosystem, I’d want some control points, some
leverage. Anything that would be at the center [. . .]
would have to have the attributes of [Jade] to hold it
together as an ecosystem. You don’t have to develop
all the products in that ecosystem; you can actually
have other companies do that. You still maintain
control and have the ability to get the bulk of the
revenue. (Green)
This type of [Ruby] technology [. . .] enables the mo-
bile device to be at the centerwith somekindof device
ecosystem. That was like the strategic thing there. At
the timewe alsowere placing ahigher priority around
thedevice, like ahardware ecosystemyoucouldbuild
around a device. (Red)
Put differently, the technology and the initial ex-
ternal partners created some initial direction for the
ecosystem, and provided guidance on what value
creation could roughly look like. Managers then tri-
angulated this informationwith company strategy to
project the corridor in which ecosystem and strategy
would overlap in the future to understand what
value capture could look like then. For example, Red
was shifting away from being a hardware company
and attempting a move to become a service-level
company. This rendered the proprietary models
initially developed for Ruby and Coral obsolete and
led Red on a search for new control points:
[Previous approach] is a very effective process to sort
of railroad the future in certain areas when you’re
changing a physical [component] . . . this is all good in
what Red has traditionally been excellent at, up to
now. Red in the last years had this kind of change in
direction 180 degrees very swiftly. All those compe-
tencies are still very valid, but they’re a subset of the
future competencies that are needed. How do you
apply standards in services and software? Is it really
the way you control the way it goes? (Red)
Similarly, Green switched to an ecosystem ap-
proach for Jade and Emerald at a time when its cor-
porate strategy started to refocus on core businesses;
to limit development resources; and to emphasize
revenues from intellectual property (IP). For Green
managers, the ecosystem dynamics that had been
triggered were also highly uncertain. Nonetheless,
they attempted to infer the future control points based
on their previous engagement with external partners:
We did go down a path with kind of a corporate di-
rection to try to sell more IP. [. . .] So, I had the re-
sponsibility of identifying areaswherewe could build
our IP revenues [. . .] and we’re already deriving some
IP revenue back from [first outsourcing supplier]. So,
somebody said: “Well,whydon’tweopen that upabit
more and generate some more IP revenue?” (Green)
The fact [was] I was constrained to certain resources
and development expenses, kind of put in the corner
to find a way. Right? And this looked like a very good
way. So, I can’t take credit for being: “you knowwhat,
we can do this.”(Green)
Wedid try to put some structure around this whenwe
were first challenged to do it and I don’t think we had
visibility into what was going to be happening 10
years from now but based on what we’d seen hap-
pening so far in themarket [. . .] beforewe picked [first
outsourcing partner]we [had gone] around and talked
to the top people in the business, at the time therewas
only four or five of them. We [had] vetted with each
one of them “what are you doing?” and sowe had that
as a knowledge base going in. That was enough for us
to put structure on it and say “this is something we
think we can do.” So, we did a little bit of an industry
survey is what I’m trying to say. (Green)
Thus, combining thevague futureprojections from
the technology-application side with firm strategy
allowed Red and Green managers to further narrow
down the set of potential ecosystem blueprints and
get an initial understanding about which range of
these may be more viable. For these, managers tried
to infer crucial future interdependencies, and which
of these could become future control points: these
were areas Red and Green would need to somehow
establish and keep control over, while letting other
companies do their own business around them.6
At one point in time you sat down and put together
a document that said here is this whole thing and
here’s where we have value and here’s where there’s
IP. (Green Jade)
You have the access to that information, so definition
of interface; that has been one pointmaybe of creating
this ecosystem. (Red Ruby)
For Green, the decision over which parts in the
envisioned ecosystem other players could do was
6 We elaborate on the specific mechanisms of dynamic
control in a separate section below.
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heuristically determined based on the strategic vision
and resources available for development:
So, we take a look at how large an effort is it, at how
strategic is that particular piece? How well does it fit
within our scope in everything we talked about before,
the manufacturing, all of the aspects of supporting of
the product? And then we have to take a look at the
business model behind it. So for example, if the de-
cision is that it’snotpartof thecore, orwecan’t affordto
do it but we need it, then we start saying “what are the
applicable business models that we have?” (Green)
Yet, some positions in the envisioned blueprints
appearedasclear controlpoints thatGreenwouldhave
to protect to ensure its future ability to capture value.
AsaGreenVPexplained, thesedecisionswereongoing
as the ecosystem evolved and the blueprint clarified:
We sit down and figure out, “so what’s the value of
that? What’s the downside of that?” I’m not going to
sell someone, my competitor, part of my patent port-
folio and then have them eat my revenue. If [Jade] is
the nugget, then it needs Green to help make that.
They can’t pull it all together for a [Jade] solution
without Green [. . .] now there are other parts that we
can open, that we are still vetting and on our side it’s
quite a conversation.Wehavepeoplewho are looking
at some of the IP and they say “we’re not going to do
that.We’re never going to let anyone have this piece.”
(Green)
Managers also construed additional control
points by projecting themselves into the envi-
sioned blueprints and looking at other aspects they
might be able to control, such as architectural
definitions, vetting rights, and certifications of
interoperability to allow membership in the eco-
system. These control points had little to do with
immediate revenue flows.
So even if, in the short term, we get squeezed out, I
thinkwecan comeback andget additional value later.
(Green)
Indeed, most of the future value capture was
envisioned through complementarity effects. Green’s
goalwas to create “revenue drags” from selling its own
products and services, so that “you will make [X] dol-
lars per year with the license, but you can make [33]
per year from the drag.” By creating ecosystems of
connectable devices and modular components, Red
was building its differentiation strategy as it envi-
sioned the horizontalization of its industry.
Our testing is basically cost recovery. It’s sort of an
enablement to sell our technology and we do profit
from selling that technology, so that’s another reason.
(Green Jade)
Now when we create the open interfaces and open
architecture, it will be so that the platform is [no
longer] the differentiator at all, it is what kind of
products you actually build, what kind of features,
performance you actually use. That is actually the
differentiation of products. (Red Coral)
Finally, these future control points had to be
defensible, as other ecosystem players would in-
evitably try to circumvent them. The more Red and
Green saw a potential to preempt such endeavors—
that they could be prevented altogether, or at least be
detected and countered—the more they would shift
their ecosystem visions toward that control point.
For example, Green could validate its choices to
“control who gets the know-how that’s inside our
core systems” when an existing ecosystem partner
started questioning Green and “got it into their heads
that it couldn’t be too complicated to do.” The ven-
dor’s engineers thought they ought to be able to re-
verse engineer a protocol and ripped one of Green’s
systems apart. They came back with a product that
they requested Green test and qualify. After failing
several times, they “tried various ways to weasel
around” and to obtain the specifications without
paying the Jade license:
We charged them for the testing, right! And they fi-
nally got frustrated and broke down and said, “okay,
and licensed the technology.”Thatwas an interesting
test of this model because if the stuff that we’re li-
censing were obvious, or [. . .] easily reverse engi-
neered, then I don’t think the ecosystem would be
stable because people would try to get the knowledge
without paying for it. And if theywere able to succeed
in doing that then we couldn’t charge for it, and if we
can’t charge for it we’re not making revenue and the
whole thing starts to break down. (Green Jade)
Similarly, both Red and Green tried to mitigate
their dependence on others by preempting that
others could establish strong control points them-
selves to gain disproportionate rents. With that aim,
Greencontinued toworkon Jadedevelopments it did
not intend to use directly, but which the partners
would need for their future applications. Similarly,
Red opened the Coral architecture to preempt any
future in which an opportunistic player would own
this control point.
You’re always driving new stuff—that gives you
a stable functioning ecosystem. So on [Green’s] side
let’s have some people doing patents that we will
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never implement in our [product], butwill have value
if they’re implemented over there because that will
drive the ecosystem. (Green)
[Red] was moving to be a product and service com-
pany so we of course saw that we will not own the
architecture, but we kind of wanted to make sure
that there [was] no other company owning it [. . .],
who would maybe otherwise make it a proprietary
system. (Red)
This reinforcing loopwhereby the focal firms infer
future control points from the set of currently envi-
sioned ecosystem blueprints and try to roadmap the
development efforts to increasingly confine the
ecosystem dynamics on a favorable path is captured
in Figure 5.
Enacting Resonance
With roadmapping and preempting, Red and
Green hoped to identify a direction for future value
creation that could justify investment for future
value capture in the present. To move toward actual
future value creation (in which this value capture
could thus happen), we found that Green and Red
managers were trying to enact resonance: a reinforc-
ing feedback loop leading to the amplification of re-
ciprocal resource commitments between external
and internal actors.
This resonance loop created increasing path de-
pendency that reduced uncertainty and entrenched
the ecosystem trajectory toward one clarified and
sharedvision.That is,different fromexisting literature
where stakeholders can be selected and coordinated
based on the future vision (e.g., Adner, 2006, 2012;
Iansiti & Levien, 2004;Williamson&DeMeyer, 2012),
we found that it was escalating internal and external
resource commitments, directed by Red and Green,
that led to ecosystems emerging thatwere beneficial to
our firms. Yet their actually realized structure had
never been planned explicitly as such. Rather, we
found that Green and Red tried to delay fully com-
mitting their own resources until the ecosystem had
(almost) naturally locked in on a target that had
emerged (almost) by itself.
Jade and Emerald already had internal momen-
tum based on successful proprietary products.
Green’s commitment to the new markets had sent
strong signals to the external firms that invested
their resources once the ecosystem creation was
triggered. Yet Green managers confirmed the chal-
lenge of convincing business lines by building ex-
ternal momentum:
Sometimes they [themain lines of business] have tobe
dragged, kicking and screaming, to the table. They say
“we’ve not done this before.” You have to get several
different parts of [Green] swimming in the same di-
rection for it to actually work and so we have to gen-
erate business and create the environment that they
say, “this is good, this can continue.” (Green)
Red managers faced this catch 22 from the start,
and had to use “a balancing act” to bootstrap reso-
nance among all stakeholders. For Coral, the archi-
tecture was perceived as a potential enabler for
versatility and faster reaction to new user require-
ments uponwhich the future product differentiation
strategy would be based. Nonetheless, Red’s busi-
ness lines only tentatively adopted the architecture
for a very limited number of new devices. For Ruby,
small-devices firms were convinced by the proto-
vision and recognized the business opportunity for
them in the envisioned blueprint. However, they
would not commit to Ruby until Red’s business lines
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would commit to include them in their devices.
Red’s business lines would not commit to include
Ruby in their devices until the semiconductor firms
would commit to develop the necessary chips. Red
managers felt they were facing “an unsolvable
equation.” As Red was changing its corporate strat-
egy, its commitment had been more timid than ex-
pected by external actors:
I think that that was a disappointment to many of the
consortium members, because watchmakers really
were looking for volumes that [Red] would bring in,
and the [device] supporting this would really be the
enabler for theirmarket, but therewas no plan, even if
[informant] and myself, we were planning that this
[would] be in each and every [Red device] in some
time, but when? No one knew. And, they were not
interested within [Red], to even think about this, be-
cause they were saying, “when are the chips avail-
able?” No one knows. (Red Ruby)
As such, building internal momentum was not
only crucial for receiving the resources necessary
to engage in ecosystem creation and formation, it
also signaled the focal firms’ commitment and in-
creased the confidence of external firms to join the
de novo ecosystem. In turn, demonstrating that
high-level firmexecutives supported the ecosystem
creation helped foster external momentum. To
achieve that, Green’s top people interacted regu-
larly with other firms, and Red used dedicated
events to reduce uncertainty and tip commitments
over a risk threshold.
You’re getting your top people from Green interacting
regularly with the top people from each one of those
companies, which ought to be a fruitful thing to do, and
ifyourecognize thataspartof theprocessandencourage
[it] then maybe new ideas will come up. (Green)
It was really a rolling ball; first you had a smaller
meeting and people were a little bit afraid, and then
when they were reassured by each other, by the next
meeting they were more aggressive and then at some
point. . .we tried to bring them together, sowe tookabit
of risk, we organized this rather big event. We had at
least 50 people from like 20 companies invited to our
headquarters. There we had an executive VP—very
senior guy from our side—open it up and say “this is
important technology for the future [Red];” and then,
you had a lot of senior people from [famous brands]
saying that “it was very important to us.” (Red)
In turn, as service-level applications and the re-
quired interdependencies clarified, more intense
collaborations were enacted with selected partners
who had recognized the desirability of the envisioned
blueprint. These initial “biggest commitments” by
external partners were reciprocated internally and
leveraged to amplify further external commitment:
It’s just bilateral discussion with another company
that we could develop a product or establish a busi-
ness together, and then gradually we could take more
companies, third company, fourth company there.
And then it becomes a consortium. . . (Red)
It is an ecosystem game; just having the technology
here doesn’t make much sense, just having it there
doesn’t make much sense. They were all depending
on each other, so whenwe brought them together and
they all said to each other “well, yes, I think this is
a cool thing,” so that created a. . . the sentiment, the
feeling, with everyone, “oh, well, this looks like it’s
really happening.” (Red Ruby)
Figure 6 captures this enacting resonance loop
leading to the amplification of reciprocal commit-
ment until the vision and ecosystem blueprint were
clarified.
Ecosystem Drift and Sliding Positions
With the envisioned blueprint becoming in-
creasingly clear, Green andRedhad to account for the
innovation efforts of external partners and to align
their own development efforts. Ideally, following the
above resonance dynamics, these resource allocation
decisions further entrenched the ecosystem trajectory
toward the envisioned blueprint.
We have to take a look at all protocols that we plan to
support, and thenwehave tomake thedecisiononour
own investment for support of those protocols. [. . .]
what is it thatwewant to drive fromour box?Whendo
we want to introduce the next bump on speed, or the
next function that comes out? Because none of these
are stagnant, so we have to pick and choose our own
investment stream, and then align that with the ven-
dors, and it’s a very good case of that. (Green)
The part which we would like to keep to ourselves
[. . .] first of all, [. . .] has to be of strategic importance
for us . . . our main business is important for us. And
then we leave others to do something which is not so
important for us. So it is according to our strategy and
we are strong, we have strong competencies, maybe
not already, but at least we know that, for example,
because of research, we have an excellent team to
work in that area. (Red)
At the same time, however, as summarized by
a Red manager below, across the four cases initial
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collaborations to explore plausible service-level ap-
plications, interactions to define requirements of the
deep-layer enabling technology, early developments
with a few selected partners, and increasing com-
mitments to an emerging blueprint meant ecosystem
creation had to be organic:
There aremany points of view to this kind of steering.
Let’s say it’s a team that consists of technology, busi-
ness people, partnering people, marketing people,
and they already have different drivers, and then the
model that there are many different partners. So
there’s the whole package and then there are these
individual companies inside there. So it’s kind of, it
has to be organic. (Red)
In turn, Red and Green had to realize that building
momentum with external partners, whose creative
agency is the raison d’eˆtre of an ecosystem, in-
troduced stochasticity in enabling and enacting
the scope of plausible futures:
Today’s emerging nontraditional areas such as fi-
nance, digital media, and decision support change
the concept of [application]. This change manifests
a new paradigm [and] calls for new solutions that
require definition in scope. (Green Emerald)
The risk is there that if people are not on the samepage,
[what you will be] delivering [and] what you are
steering won’t meet [sic]. (Red)
Such drifting of the emerging ecosystem dynam-
ics, away from the envisioned blueprint, could
naturally happen as new applications and interde-
pendencieswere discovered over time, andhad to be
accounted for. In addition, other firms (beyond cir-
cumventing the focal firm’s coveted control points or
creating some of their own) might even have
attempted to purposively change the direction of
value creation altogether by directly opposing the
protovision and attempting to swiftly preempt its
occurrence.
Such potential drifting of the anticipated value
creation by the emerging ecosystem put Red and
Green under threat that their anticipated control
points were sliding, within the crystallizing blue-
print, away from the emerging sources of future
value capture. With ecosystem drift, other actors
could maneuver to establish their own protovisions
or even control points. Indeed, in our four cases, as
more partners committed and allocated resources
they also influenced the direction of the ecosystem
trajectory: their innovations and creative agency in-
creased the range of alternative futures. These com-
petitive and often unexpected dynamics threatened
the strategic value of the focal firms’ envisioned
control points and forced Green and Red to contin-
uously evaluate the risk of the ecosystem drifting
and their positions sliding within the emerging
blueprint:
Somewhere down the line, within the next five, 10
years, I have no certainty that they will not do some-
thing that destroys my product and my product line.
(Green)
So many options are valuable. So using a kind of new
scenario to build the case and being flexible also to
change the scenario when you get maybe stronger
identities emerging. (Red)
Our analysis shows that two mechanisms pas-
sively moderated the drift. First, the risk of ecosys-
tem drift was limited over time by a finite number of
potential ecosystem partners:
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The amount of new vendors coming in, looking at the
horizon, has decreased because we have seven and
maybe there’s only a handful left that are in this
market. So eventually it will saturate. (Green)
Basically 2006 was just playing this ecosystem game.
These guys, [informant], travelled all over the world
and tried to getmore companies on board. And I think
in 2006 we then were able to get [large firms]. And
those companies were basically. . . I think they rep-
resented something like 70%, 80% of the whole [ap-
plication] market. So, these were the three big players
there. (Red)
Second, as each enabling technology matured,
path dependencies limited their further generativity
and moderated the effect of external agency on the
range of alternative futures:
While subsequent technical innovations remained
significant, they were naturally less disruptive than
the original products which created the market, and
some of themwere muchmore incremental advances
in the state of the art. (Green)
Starting from 2007, there are more and more other
companies that have taken the major role of defining
the direction. So, we are not in the background, but
there is less and less ownership because we think it is
going the right way. (Red)
Figure 7 indicates how two balancing loops—B1,
“ecosystem drifting” and B2, “sliding positions”—
counteracted the reinforcingnarrowing, roadmapping,
preempting, and resonance loops by reintroducing
uncertainty in the ecosystem creation process. The
creative agency of an increasingly large number of
external players had the potential to dissolve the
emerging blueprint and threaten the strategic value of
the focal firm’s future control points, even though
these effects were moderated by an ultimate limit to
externalmomentumandbystrongpathdependencies.
For an ecosystem blueprint to actually crystallize,
we found that R1, R2, R3, and R4 had to strongly
supersede B1 and B2. For example, despite recog-
nizing the appeal of Coral and the strong pull from
external partners, Red committed only timidly to the
architecture, with “only one or two guys inside [Red]
whowere kind of guiding these 12 companies.”Over
time, some external partners who had adopted the
service modularization approach maneuvered and
took the idea into completely different areas, such
that Red’s initial protovision weakened.
[Coral ecosystem’s] in a reasonable state, but it’s not
the lively ecosystem that wewere targeting [. . .] when
we started to do this whole ecosystem creation. (Red)
Dynamic Control
As we have seen above, legal ownership of future
control points (such as IP) still held significant po-
tential to contribute to future value capture. How-
ever, such static controlwas not sufficient to ensure
value capture, given the long timespan and the
creative agency of others.
Our analysis indicates that “winning at the ecosys-
tem game” was about maintaining dynamic control
over the coupled feedback loops constituting the
emergent, uncertain, and collective process captured
in Figure 8 (and detailed in Appendix A): managers
had to continuously amplify the reinforcing loops,
whichcrystallized the blueprint, and to counteract the
balancing loops, which dissolved the blueprint, made
the ecosystem drift, and undermined the firm’s envi-
sioned control points. Our cases demonstrate that the
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initially static approach to control based solely on
ownership of specific assets deemed to be currently
valuable broke down the moment firms entered the
ecosystem game. Rather, strategic control had to be-
come continuous, closed-loop, and targeted at the or-
chestration of collective action and the maneuvering
of the focal firm.
This form of dynamic control over highly un-
certain and collective processeswas not evident, and
challenged the focal firms in our four cases of eco-
system creation. As several managers explained to
us, they had to learn to remain agile while main-
taining control:
We’ve learnt how to, youknow,migrate andmorph into
things that we need to. So, it’s not like I have complete
control, but I cannot lose total control. (Green)
This was one of the first success cases in this sort of
environment, where we really started to create the
ecosystem. We learned a lot about this ecosystem
creation. We understood that sometimes 50% of the
whole thing is this business development ecosystem
creation, technology marketing; the sort of stuff we
did not traditionally do in Red. (Red)
It was really kind of agile in terms of what we should
do to really make this happen. We didn’t have any
really fixedplans, youknow, “this is howweare going
to make it happen and we’re going to stick to it, no
matter what.” It was like, listening to the partners,
listening to the internal programs, what their expec-
tations were and then, you know, trying to keep it as
holistically manageable. (Red)
Our empirical evidence highlights the classical
challenge encountered by firms when they think
about playing the ecosystem game: by relinquishing
ownership over certain parts to external players in
the ecosystem, they feel they lose the “ability to
manage and control:”
As a matter of fact, I don’t even have control
on whether they’re going to implement [function].
We lose the ability to manage and control,
whatever the right term is, the delivery of that
function on that particular component. That’s what
I lose. We are relying on it, we try to [have] influ-
ence. (Green)
Hence, managers enacted other dimensions of
control that were usually subsumed in the concept.
Specifically, to orchestrate the crystallization of an
ecosystem blueprint while at the same time ensuring
future value capture, Green and Red enacted three
dimensions of dynamic control: influencing the di-
rection of ecosystem evolution toward a clarified
vision and coveted control points, monitoring the
evolution of the ecosystems and likely realization
of future control points, and updating strategies in
case of mismatches.
Influencing. Managers used influencing mecha-
nisms to narrow down the future, to clarify the
blueprint and entrench the trajectory through in-
creasing commitments, and to establish envisioned
control points. These mechanisms amplified the
reinforcing loops R1, R2, R3 and R4 and counter-
acted the balancing loop B1 and B2 (see Figure 7).
Across the four cases, these mechanisms included
company visits, workshops and events, discursive
strategies, vetting of partners, qualification pro-
cesses, architectural boards, arbitrage of roadmaps,
market power, and preemptive moves.
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For each type of control point, there is an underlying
power base. On the technological dimension, stan-
dards or de facto ones are strong levers. Can you build
your ecosystem and create control points, or can you
merely influence the unfolding dynamics? (Green)
What Imean by control is howyou exert an influence in
away that you channel an environment in the direction
that you know you’re well equipped to profit. (Red)
Through meetings, workshops, or conferences, the
firms attempted to imprint, in a performative manner,
their protovision upon selected partners. Managers in
Green and Red described this as a “persuasion game”
where everyone is “depending on each other:”
The first part is getting everyone on the same page.
The second part of the workshop is “if this is the ar-
chitecture of the [protovision], then what is the role
individuals have? What’s the vested interest that
people want to try and drive forward with?” (Green)
It’s more a question of being clear about what it is you
want to get out of it and really clarifying that as
quickly as possible, so that you can bring along part-
ners without misleading them; and in a way that
drives towards a common vision of what the value
chain will be. (Red)
However, through external engagement the vision
was also evolving. Red and Green had to leverage
other mechanisms to steer the ecosystem dynamics
toward a desirable blueprint and limit drifting. In the
Green cases, market power and direct access to the
client were also possible; however, in the opinion of
a Green VP, this is “an ugly place to have [. . .] influ-
ence.” Other steering mechanisms ranged from the
vetting of partners in the ecosystem, to trying to in-
fluence the direction of partners’ roadmaps, to ex-
pensivecertificationprocesses,whichpartly influenced
the timing of complementors’ releases so as to achieve
synchrony (Davis, 2013):
When the [partners] come to us and say we have this
list of features, [Green] can tell them “these features
are of good, bad or indifferent interest to us;” “I want
you to qualify this, this and this immediately; these
can wait until next year; this not so much”. . . (Green)
Youcouldhave three companiesworking ona camera
module and they would each be talking to you but
they will not be talking [to each other]. (Red Coral)
Both firms strived to retain their ability to directly
influence the direction of innovation in the generic en-
ablers.ForEmerald,GreensetupaweeklyArchitectural
Review Board with editorial power to review the
vendors’ requests for change in the specifications.
Red established committees for Ruby and placed its
own people in key positions to keep arbitrage over
suggestions for improvements to the enabling tech-
nology. Red hadmade Coral an open architecture but
tried to influence the trajectory by being the most ac-
tive contributor.
All the companies pretty well understood where we
would like to go [with Ruby]. Of course, we still had
all the ropes in our hands andwewere prettymuch in
control. (Red Ruby)
Those who are most actively contributing own it, and
there is no ownership by any other means, but if you
want to develop it, then you have control where it
goes. (Red Coral)
Monitoring. To be able to influence the ecosystem
dynamics, it was crucial for both firms to know what
was going on. Red and Green tried to get an in-
formational advantage through broad scanning net-
works and leveraging some of the influencing
mechanisms for a monitoring purpose. For example,
Red used its conferences and showcase events to
monitor generativity:
There is [another] innovation that is built on top of
[Coral] but was happening outside. There used to be
a so-called [Red conference] once per year, a big event
[at which] different vendors could show their latest
technologies under NDA to [Red]. (Red)
So then we do scanning. We scan what’s available. It
requires being present [via] the Internet, databases,
colleagues, bankers etc. who are active VCs, trade
shows. Meetings are very important. So you need to
meet lots of people because it’s a big world. (Red)
Similarly, Green took the position of a “neutral”
broker in its Jade ecosystem. On a bilateral basis,
Green exchanged roadmapswith each complementor,
then synthesized and anonymously shared all in-
formation. Green gained an overview of all ongoing
developments and updated its roadmap to antici-
pate potential dynamics. Then, by communicating
its roadmap updates, Green could influence other
players to align their innovation trajectories with
Green’s preferred direction.
All the vendors present to us their roadmaps. They
also tell us what’s the new feature and function that’s
coming. [. . .] As the keystone, we get the big picture.
We synthesize that, we flush out things that are pro-
prietary to certain vendors so that it can be shared and
thenwepropagate that back to all of themand they get
value from it. (Green)
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Green and Red managers noticed that ecosystem
partners were also monitoring each other to see
whether they were aligned with the ecosystem’s
evolution or could get a competitive edge:
As I told you, all these vendors are very com-
petitive and they’re always looking for market in-
telligence on each other and trying to find an edge.
(Green)
Even though all this was confidential, some people
just hear that something is happening, so there were
all sorts of queries that they had heard that there is
something new happening here. (Red)
Via their key positions in committees, both firms
could also monitor the demands for changes to core
technologies that provided valuable information
about nondisclosed elements of the partners’ strate-
gies, such as their potential intent to migrate in the
ecosystem blueprint:
The edges become fuzzy: your partners may become
competitors. The challenge is to keep track of the
dynamic externalities. (Green)
In addition, conversations between the focal firms
and their complementors were not one-off, but on-
going. This allowed Red and Green to monitor and
process, almost in real time, the direction and rate of
change in their ecosystems, as described by a senior
manager in Green:
It’s not like we only do it when we have meetings, we
talk to them informally on a regular basis; “what do
things look like today?” Take the temperature of it.
That kind of informal interaction is a tremendous
benefit. (Green)
Updating. Based on the information continuously
gathered through these monitoring mechanisms, the
managers formed expectations about what could
happen in the ecosystem given others’ commit-
ments. If they perceived a deviation from what they
were previously expecting, they updated their
influencing strategies (first order) or the protovision,
the envisioned blueprint and coveted control points
(secondorder). Regarding first-order updating,when
first engaging with component suppliers Coral
managers understood that modularity had various
meanings for different people (e.g., software vs.
hardware engineers). They changed their influenc-
ing efforts to “partly educate them.” Coral managers
also shifted their rhetoric to communicate Red’s vi-
sion after receiving a lot of pushback when present-
ing Coral as a change in architecture:
Companies are built around architecture; we tried to
“sell architecture,” which meant you would have to
change. So, we changed to “selling solutions to sa-
lient, tangible problems.” (Red)
Second-order updating became necessary when
internal changes in corporate strategy or exter-
nal information implied that influencing was un-
successful or inadequate. Such changes led the
managers to update their envisioned blueprints or
coveted control points.
At the same time, the scenarios themselves [were]
continuously updated based on user evaluation re-
sults and feedback from technology and application
developers. (Red)
We had big ambitions in the gaming side at the time.
We also had. . . at the timewe hadmore vision around
watches and all of that. I mean, you have to un-
derstand that things have changed over. . . the vision
and strategy we have today is not the same as it was
at the time. (Red Ruby)
Green updated the business case for Jade: it
moved from selling a proprietary product to
rebranding, then moved to a licensing model when
it envisioned the ecosystem, and finally charged
partners for its certification tests. Likewise, after
realizing the heterogeneity of market segments, the
Emerald team updated both the vision and the
control points: they opened the specifications to
enable vendors to respond to these very specific
market needs.
The business case for Ruby was also updated sev-
eral times. Initially, it was thought of as a proprietary
technology, then it moved to a per-piece licensing
model with its ecosystem partners. Then, as Red de-
cided to no longer directly manage the ecosystem, it
went for a “pokermove” to be perceived as a threat so
as to be finally absorbed into an existing competing
standard. Yet, on entering the much-hoped-for
merger, the business case was updated again:
The very first initial idea, at least internally, was that
we thought that we would collect a license fee per
[piece], from the [component] vendors, nobody else.
But [it] came up quite early that it’s probably never
going to be possible. [Software multinational] would
not accept it. So the very final change into the agree-
ment before signing was that it was not a licensing
agreement. Itwas amerger of twoconsortiums. [Ruby]
was merged with [existing standard] and the com-
pensation is not compensation for the technology. It’s
not a license fee. The compensation to [Red] is for
having put the effort and the investment [into]
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building and creating the [Ruby] ecosystem, and
gaining this wide acceptance in the industry, so far.
That was to be compensated. (Red)
Nevertheless, several Red managers insisted that
a hard core of the protovision remained intact:
It’s kind of maybe capability that was really to change
something, but always there is some kind of a hard
core there, a fundamental innovation there that is not
changing. We had basically the same vision that all
parties saw a lot of value in the devices being able to
communicate [with] each other [. . .] If the vision is
strong enough, it will survive all the instability. This
is a kind of acid test. (Red)
DISCUSSION
We set out from the premise that when creating
new ecosystems starting from generative technolog-
ical inventions—which are often deeply embedded
into an industry architecture, or even yet-to-be-
discovered—traditional models of ecosystem evo-
lution and governance will struggle to provide
guidance. Our data show that playing such an “eco-
system game” is a directed process in which firms
orchestrate the crystallization of an increasingly
clearer envisioned blueprint: they delay their own
resource commitment to keep open the option
space of desirable ecosystem outcomes, but act pre-
emptively to veto undesirable futures. This process
works through a series of coupled feedback loops,
which ecosystem creators can influence through
dynamic control. In doing so, actors try to influence,
simultaneously, the envisioning and enactment of
value creation and value capture. They drive, itera-
tively, present action to achieve clarity about what
the value created by the ecosystem will eventually
be, while at the same time trying to understand
which control points they need to establish and de-
fend now to ensure they can capture the lion’s share
of the value to be created.
Implications for Theory
Our findings allow us to make three key contri-
butions to the emerging literature on innovation
ecosystems and to broader discussions on innova-
tion strategy and strategic entrepreneurship.
The first, naturally, is the conceptual model we
developed. While we are not the first to have argued
for a distinct treatment of early-stage ecosystems
(see also Jain, 2012; Le Masson et al., 2009; Mo¨ller,
2010), to the best of our knowledge ours is the first
comprehensive attempt to untangle how agents can
drive ecosystem creation based on innovative gen-
erative technologies. In short, we introduce a phase
of radical technology and market uncertainty before
the current linear perspective of envisioning design
(e.g., Adner, 2012; Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Iansiti
& Levien, 2004). In this stage, actors discover, rather
than plan, the ecosystem approach, engaging in it
only when learning about significant external in-
terest. While the linear process may of course still
“follow after” our model, our model may further
explain cases with which that perspective currently
struggles, such as the IBM PC case mentioned
initially.
Our closed-loop model of de novo ecosystem cre-
ation is also reminiscent of the literature on domi-
nant designs and first-mover advantage.7 When
faced with high uncertainty, firms need to fear
that irreversible resource commitments can easily be
overtaken by a second mover (Suarez & Lanzolla,
2005; Suarez & Utterback, 1995; Teece, 1986). We
find that our ecosystem creators devised a strategy in
which, rather than trying to tackle this uncertainty
head on by betting on one specific application, they
distributed the explorative generation of alternatives
(Gruber et al., 2008; Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007) to
their emerging ecosystem. Then, by abductively
narrowing down the range of alternative futures
(Dunne & Dougherty, 2016; Reetz & MacAulay,
2016), they hoped for clear signals and resource
commitments from other actors in the system while
ensuring they could strike as soon as they identified
a valuable opportunity (Sull, 2005). Thus, ourmodel
explains that while actors delay commitment in or-
der to keep the space of possible value creation open,
they also act based on their anticipations of
value capture to preempt undesirable futures before
an ecosystem blueprint crystallizes. We believe that
this distinction helps to reintroduce managerial
agency and, as we elaborate below, clarify recent
debates on process research in entrepreneurship
(see, e.g., Arend, Sarooghi, & Burkemper, 2016). In
addition, we argue that such a design may hold gen-
eral promise for when firms try to introduce novel
generative, deep-layer, or general-purpose (see
Gambardella &McGahan, 2010) technologies to the
market. The tactics we identified may thus also be
of assistance to firms hoping to establish industry
platforms or standards. In fact, the multilayered
architecture in the context of our case studies
7 We thank Professor Fernando Suarez for pointing out
this parallel to us.
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simply highlights the temporal and applicative
distances between a generative technology and the
set of heterogeneous future value propositions it en-
ables. Hence, in essence, our model has explanatory
power in the more general case where technological
generativity makes it difficult for a firm to determine
the nature and range of such applications ex ante.
Second, by embracing the uncertainty necessarily
inherent to ecosystem creation, we bring the “sys-
tem back into ecosystem:” our model allows for
a (systems) dynamic perspective on ecosystems, and,
hence, for a bridge to that work (see also, e.g., Azoulay
et al., 2010; Morecroft, 2007; Repenning & Sterman,
2002; Sterman, 2000). The logic of dynamic control,
our second contribution,must follow from this view in
which a system can never be statically controlled—
except for the (as we would argue, rare) case of one
firm owning the entire ecosystem. Rather, our model
portrays ecosystem strategy as a closed-loop process
where a protovision provides a general direction (see
also Sull, 2005, 2007). To prevent control becoming
episodic and fleeting, organizations will need to in-
stall control points into a nascent system (Pagani,
2013; Tilson et al., 2010) and to strategically navigate
the process of discovering value creation to ensure
eventual value capture.
The notion of anticipated control points in the
emerging ecosystem blueprints relates to recent
calls in the demand-side perspective literature on
the resource-based view to endogenize the de-
termination of a resource’s value (e.g., Priem, Butler,
& Li, 2013; Schmidt & Keil, 2013). What we show is
the complexity of deciding just what a defensible
control point is: the control point can only help with
value capture in the future, if (not merely “when”)
value creation itself has happened, and only if in the
way the firm anticipated. Hence, our process model
turns around the temporality of value in existing
discussions: our findings translate into the premise
that value can only emerge from a value proposition
that lies in the future, so that the value of a given
resource or control point must be determined by
projecting oneself into an image of the future, instead
of extrapolating the past.
As such, value creation and value capture may, as
in some of our cases, become fully separated, in that
control can no longer be connected solely to fixed
assets required to produce the focal innovation
(Teece, 1986). Rather, dynamic control over the
process of ecosystem emergence will draw in-
creasingly on institutional and sociological devices
(Thomas et al., 2014) that allow for influencing and
monitoring. These dynamics will then steer the
process toward intangible control points such as
customer access, networking ability, or brand, all of
which, at least conceptually, might even be ampli-
fied by waiving ownership on underlying assets
(Alexy, West, Klapper, & Reitzig, 2017). Indeed, in
line with a growing body of conceptual work (Alexy,
George, & Salter, 2013; Tilson et al., 2010; Yoo et al.,
2010), as well as insights from the linear ecosystems
model (e.g., Gawer & Cusumano, 2002), our findings
suggest that strategically sharing IPmaybe essential to
moving the future ecosystem toward where the focal
firm would want it—or to at least limit directional
change (see Stieglitz, Knudsen, & Becker, 2016) to
prevent drifting (see also Polidoro & Toh, 2011).
Third, existing entrepreneurship literature, with
its emphasis on value creation under uncertainty,
has offered powerful insights on how to look at
multiple opportunities at the same time and commit
resources sequentially. Based on real-option logics,
several authors have highlighted the importance of
generating multiple alternatives (see, e.g., Gruber
et al., 2008, 2013) andhave advisedmanagers to keep
their options open over time, instead of committing
prematurely to wild bets (McGrath & MacMillan,
2000). Our findings extend these recommendations
to settings previously characterized as “stepping
stones” (McGrath & MacMillan, 2000: 168–171,
2009: 61–62). These are the situations in which real-
options-based approaches should apply most, and
yet are also the situations for which existing toolsets
seem least detailed and their application most chal-
lenging. We argue that this may be because when
technological generativity andmarket heterogeneity
combine to form fundamental uncertainty, itmaynot
be possible to grasp the nature of future opportuni-
ties; hence, managers may fall into the options trap
(Adner & Levinthal, 2004). As one of our informants
stated, whenmanagers face a “mind-blowing space of
exploration,” they are limited in their ability to con-
struct the option space ex ante, and to identify clear
assumptions upon which to design any experiments.
Rather, we found our managers resorting to tech-
niques similar to the idea of pivoting found in the
entrepreneurship practice literature (Osterwalder &
Pigneur, 2010; Ries, 2011), in which they conducted
iterative, abduction-like hypothesis testing.8
In this context, prior entrepreneurship literature
has demonstrated the positive impact on perfor-
mance of constructing and considering a broader set
of potential applications, but also that, given
8 Note that both of our case events and our data collec-
tion predate this literature.
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managers’ bounded rationality and firms’ control
over limited resources, there are diminishing returns
to constructing a larger set on their own (Gruber et al.,
2008).At the same time,work thathas tried to solve the
latter issues by focusing solely on the resources a given
firmhas tohand toconstruct its future (Baker&Nelson,
2005; Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy et al., 2008) has
assumed that organizations are in the process of
finding a goal. Hence, that literature has essentially
negated the idea that clearly preferable versions of
the future exist for the firm, that multiple organi-
zationsmay be simultaneously competing to realize
their preferred one, and that they will somehow
need to influence others to commit their resources
in order for any value creation and value capture to
happen. In turn, our model may allow for a new per-
spective towardcombininggoal-orientedandprocess-
oriented models of entrepreneurship research in
general, and corporate venturing in particular, in
a way that entrepreneurship practice seems to have
embraced already.
Implications for Practice
For practitioners, we provide insights into how to
play the ecosystem game. Our model demonstrates
that managers can leverage the generativity of an
enabling technology by distributing the explorative
generation of heterogeneous alternatives to external
actors in the emerging ecosystem. This requires
shifting managerial attention away from the sole
focus on the control of current resources to a more
encompassing concern for the dynamic control of
ecosystem dynamics. Such approaches will require
phronetic abilities (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 2011)
from the individual managers responsible for de
novo ecosystem creation. As our data show, they are
the ones who bootstrap the protovision: they get
initial interest from a potential partner, come back
internally to show that there is external interest, get
some support from internal stakeholders, and meet
other external partners and show them that theyhave
obtained internal support for the technology and that
they canmake a commitment. As senior managers at
Red explained to us, playing the ecosystem game
well requires “excellent business development guys,
who really find the way how to play the game in
[new technological domains],”who “understand the
complexities of that kind of approach,” but who are
“pragmatic, even though we are talking about the
future.”
These remarks resonate with McGrath’s (2013)
advice to managers that as competitive advantages
become transient, individuals must develop strate-
gies to acquire the competencies and the embedded
relationships to work in “flux.” Ultimately, the dif-
fusion of the ecosystem model may lead to tensions
in the current paradigm based on value captured
solely through the legal ownership of assets. The
ecosystem game, as a class of distributed strategies,
may hence even prompt a new primary cycle in
management models (see Bodrozˇic´ & Adler, 2017).
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
Ofcourse, our study is notwithout limitations.Our
purposive case selection is biased toward large firms:
to study de novo ecosystem creation, we focused on
actors that have the market power and resources to
credibly engage in such behavior. However, these
factors need not be preconditions for the phenome-
non we explain, as shown by our introductory ex-
ample on Apple. Similarly, the multilayered IT
industry we selected is known to promise particu-
larly high returns from successful ecosystem ap-
proaches, and has thus been the focus of much work
on ecosystems. Yet, in a broader sense, our cases
studies are about the coextensive evolution be-
tween a protovision of a broad range of futures (with
a core fundamental idea) and the development of
an underlying generative technology. It is this
generativity, spurring unexpected innovations by
uncoordinated actors to address heterogeneous
markets, that challenges the linear model of ecosys-
tem strategy and the real-options logic (also see
Tilson et al., 2010; Yoo et al., 2010). In turn, any in-
dustry that has generative potential may be, or be-
come, subject to thedynamicswedescribe.Although
it is difficult to pinpoint industries not affected by
digitalization, we still call for replicative studies in
less layered and less modular industry architectures
(see Jacobides, MacDuffie, & Tae, 2016; Yoo et al.,
2010).Here, furtherwork should investigatewhether
the fundamental uncertainty introduced by the
temporal and applicative distances between a gen-
erative technology and a range of alternative futures
leads to the same ecosystem creation dynamics as
our model predicts. Currently, other generative
technologies such as nanotechnologies, genome
editing and engineering (such as CRISPR), or even
microbiota therapies, broadly promise to enable an
unbounded and as-yet undetermined range of pos-
sible futures.
Moreover,we consider five researchquestions that
seem particularly promising to extend our findings.
First, we call for studies on how an ecosystem “gets
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out of control” when the firm(s) initiating it can no
longer steer its evolution or end up ostracized. Are
such developments driven by firms’ locking in too
early on a vision, or by a loss of dynamic control?
Second, our findings regarding abductive search
may open an avenue for new perspectives on search-
ing and strategizing, in light of recent conceptual
(Lord, Dinh, & Hoffman, 2015; Reetz & MacAulay,
2016) and empirical (Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2012)
work in this space.
Third, following our argument on the separation
of value creation and capture, we call for more work
to study control points and their origination, de-
fense, application, and actual operationalization.
Approaches such as design structure matrices
(MacCormack, Rusnak, & Baldwin, 2006) or quali-
tative comparative analysis (e.g., Ragin, 2000) ap-
plied at the level of ecosystem blueprints seem
particularly promising. Our findings suggest that
firms can choose for their ecosystem among config-
urations of interdependencies with components
suppliers and complementors, and control points
predicated on strong IP or unique customer access,
depending on firm strategy. These choices suggest
the need to revisit assumptions of ecosystem uni-
formity and to establish a typology of ecosystem
designs best suited to varying contexts from a con-
figuration theory perspective, as preliminarily pro-
posed by Pagani (2013), so as to understand which
type of control point is most applicable when.
Fourth, drawing on system dynamics and feedback
control theory (see also Morecroft, 2007; Repenning
& Sterman, 2002), future work should elaborate in
particular on the competitive dynamics in which
these control points come into play, as well as con-
sidering whether further insight may be garnered by
importing additional concepts, such as entropy, to
explain thedevelopmentof innovationecosystems. In
addition—and beyond the suggestions we havemade
above—this perspective may allow for extending
discussions on the demand side perspective of the
resource-based view (Priem et al., 2013).
Finally, our process model explains how the
mutually delayed commitment of resources by both
internal and external actors was bootstrapped by
managers responsible for de novo ecosystem creation.
This enacted resonance is a central concept of our
theorizing, for which we imagine exciting avenues for
further research. Assuming a typology of ecosystems,
does resonance play a more central role in some types
than in others? Should resonance be built at faster
speed (higher frequencies) under certain conditions?
These research questions also induce methodological
issues around the operationalization of the “clarity” of
the envisioned blueprint or the characterization of
“momentum.” Is there a clarity cut-off point beyond
which the universe of potential futures becomes more
graspable and clear assumptions can finally be for-
mulated according to the real-options logic? Here,
simulation studies could also identify the appropriate
levers to reach the tippingpointofmomentumrequired
to create the self-sustaining performativity of an
ecosystem blueprint championed by a firm.
Potential shortcomings aside, we have presented
a revised model of ecosystem creation that tries to
account for the uncertainty inherent in such en-
deavors when they originate from generative
technologies—in our cases, deep within the tech-
nological architecture. We have shown how a sys-
tems perspective emphasizing dynamic control
holds the potential to extend our understanding of
how ecosystems can be effectively designed in this
context. In doing so, we hope that we have set the
stage for a fruitful area of research that will continue
to inform academe and practice alike.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE A1
Dynamic Control of Ecosystem Feedback Loops
R1
Name NARROWING THE FUTURE Influencing Select first applications
Develop technology
Engage with selected customers
Goal Establish protovision Monitoring Scan technological convergence
Envision future use cases
Description Developments in a deep-layer technology lead to
a narrower range of applications.
Updating Understand use cases
Heterogeneous applications require further
technological developments.
Test design assumptions
Update protovision
R2
Name KEEPING UP Influencing Editorial decisions over the roadmap. Develop
technology. Vetting.
Goal Provide the necessary enablers Monitoring Requests for specification changes.
Description Initial switch to an ecosystemmodel is triggered by an
external pull. Resource commitment inscribes
a certain, albeit unpredictable, direction to the
ecosystem dynamics. Focal firm must keep up.
Updating Update roadmap to fit requests
R3
Name ROADMAPPING AND PREEMPTING Influencing Develop future resources
Build business case
Define tech roadmap
Goal Establish future control points Monitoring Notice emergence of novel applications. Monitor
changes in strategy.
Description Focal firm infers future control points and roadmaps
development efforts to increasingly confine the
ecosystem dynamics on a favorable path.
Updating Modify business case
Update roadmap
R4
Name ENACTING RESONANCE Influencing Demonstrate interest by senior decisionmakers andby
renowned brands.
Goal Resource commitment Monitoring Identify business lines. Monitor changes in strategy.
Recognize interested partners.
Description Managers bootstrap expectations. Amplification of
reciprocal commitment until the vision and
ecosystem blueprint are clarified.
Updating Change influencing tactics, rhetoric, or targets.
B1
Name ECOSYSTEM DRIFTING Influencing Convince others of the opportunities in your blueprint
Goal Counteract to preserve blueprint Monitoring Keep track of ecosystem momentum
Notice emergence of novel applications
Description The maneuvering and creative agency of an
increasingly large number of external players has
the potential to dissolve the emerging blueprint.
Updating Update the value blueprint with emerging
interdependencies
B2
Name SLIDING POSITIONS Influencing Imprint vision on others. Claim centrality. Shape
direction and rate of their roadmaps. Vet.
Goal Continuous adjustment of business case Monitoring Emergence of novel application. Estimate others’
centrality.
Description Build momentum around control points in the
envisioned blueprint. Maintain a central position.
Counteract sliding by adjusting business case.
Updating Change business case to suit powerful others or to
preempt others.
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